Decentralisation of forest management has advanced across the world, and local people , s participation has been a vital element in achieving sustainable forest management. In 2001, Collaborative Forest Management (PHBM) was initiated by the State Forest Company (Perhutani) in Java, Indonesia, in order to manage state forests in collaboration with local communities. The objectives of this study are to 1) examine the contract configuration and organisation structure of PHBM, 2)
INTRODUCTION
T h e d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n a n d d e v o l u t i o n o f f o r e s t management, which have progressed across the world (e.g. Fisher 1999 , Poteete 2004 , Barr et al. 2006 , Balooni and Inoue 2007 , are one of the most important forest governance trends in the 21 st centur y (Agrawal et al. 2008) . In 2005, 80% of the global forest area was publicly owned (FAO 2010) , but it has been shrinking since then.
Meanwhile, the forest area designated for the use of communities and indigenous people, and owned by communities, indigenous people, individuals, and firms, has been expanding, as shown by data from 2002 to 2008 (Sunderlin et al. 2008) .
Indonesia has the world , s third largest area of tropical rain forest following after Brazil and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and their biological richness is unique (FWI/GFW 2002) . According to MoF environmental destr uction and social justice for historically marginalised people (Brosius et al. 1998 ).
There is a correlation between chronic poverty and the remaining areas of natural forest (Sunderlin et al. 2005) , and taking into account the par ticipation of the local people and communities has been an indispensable concept in the push for sustainable forest management and poverty alleviation (Inoue 2000 , Purnomo et al. 2005 , Sunderlin et al. 2005 .
In Indonesia, various par ticipation schemes company-community partnerships, Community Forestry (Pembangunan Masyarakat Desa Hutan or PMDH) (Mayers and Vermeulen 2002) , and its main characteristic is the empowerment of local community organisations at the village level to engage in forest management alongside Perhutani (Astuti et al. 2004 , Awang et al. 2006 . State foresters in Indonesia have controlled labour and villagers in the area by restricting their access to forest land and products, and adopting national and international ideologies to buttress or legitimise their control (Peluso 1992) . Established in 1972, Perhutani has been the sole state forest manager in Java; in fact, the Ministry of Forestry has been under the impression that only Perhutani had the capability to control state forests in the entire island (Astuti et al. 2004 , Awang et al. 2006 .
Also, since time immemorial, Taungya system has been utilised for reforestation: Perhutani granted labourers access to a forest plot to grow agricultural crops for less than three years in exchange for their contribution to reforestation (Peluso 1992 ).
Perhutani , s social forestry program in Java began in
1986 as a pilot concept to deal with the resistance of farmers to customary land rights and international trends in forest policy (Sunderlin et al. 1990 , Peluso 1992 , Lindayati 2000 , Mayers and Vermeulen 2002 , Large 2005 , Simon 2008 ). In 1992, after the pilot projects, a broader program known as PMDH was introduced (Mayers and Vermeulen 2002, Large 2005) . As in other countries, PMDH was implemented in degraded state forests to rehabilitate them (Sunderlin et al. 1990 , Peluso 1992 , Lindayati 2000 , Poteete 2004 , Wiersum 2004 , Large 2005 .
PMDH had meant to allow the local community to participate in all forest management activities, but the scheme actually became a simple labour-for-land deal (Mayers and Vermeulen 2002 (Mayers and Vermeulen 2002) ; the high rate of deforestation due to weak law enforcement under decentralisation (Rosyadi et al. 2005) ; ecological degradation, forest encroachment, and rampant illegal logging (Lindayati 2000 , Nawir et al. 2007 , Nomura 2008 , Yokota et al. 2009 ; the local people , s prosperity ( Yo ko ta et al . 2 0 09 ); a n d t he sh i f t f r om t im b er management to forest resource management (Nawir et al 2007 , Simon 2008 , and from state-based to communitybased management (Nawir et al. 2007) . Other objectives of PHBM included the development of income sources other than timber to improve the poor financial condition of Perhutani (Nomura 2008) and message for market because Perhutani was suspended Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certification (Mayers and Vermeulen 2002, Nomura 2008 ).
E a r l i e r s t u d i e s o n P H B M ( e . g . M a y e r s a n d forest governance under the decentralisation era, the objectives of this study are to 1) examine the contract configuration and organisational structure of PHBM, 2)
clarify changes in the social economy and forest management after the introduction of PHBM, 3) describe the attitudes of the local people toward PHBM, and 4) discuss the challenges to the further implementation of PHBM.
STUDY SITE AND RESEARCH METHOD
The research was conducted in KPH Pemalang, Central To su ppo r t PH BM plan n in g , facili tate loc al community organisations, and enhance their capacity to participate in PHBM process, an international project, n a m e d L e v e l l i n g t h e P l a y i n g F i e l d ( L P F ) w a s activities in allocated land and the contribution of each activity to household economy; 3) the desired tree species to be planted next; 4) awareness of benefit sharing; and 5) a w a r e n e s s o f v i l l a g e d e v e l o p m e n t . U s i n g t h e questionnaire, individual interviews were conducted with 22 board members (12 from Glandang and 10 from Surajaya) who had become board members since the LMDH was established and 32 general members in G l a n d a n g a n d S u r a j a y a . T h e g e n e r a l m e m b e r respondents were selected randomly -16 persons from each village. Secondary data, such as statistics, contract documents, and materials related to PHBM were also collected from the offices of Perhutani KPH Pemalang, the district forest agency, the village government, and the LMDH at the time of the interviews. is organised by the forest farmers. Allocated lands are usually managed by individual forest farmers (Fig. 1 ).
RESEARCH FINDINGS
There are two types of contract configuration in KPH for the investor, and 30% for the LMDH. Cost burden per ha 4,600,000 4,600,000 4,600,000 3,000,000 1,600,000 less than 10% are covered by special contracts ( Table 3) .
Although Perhutani is interested in expanding the areas with special contracts, the LMDHs in KPH Pemalang have a limited financial capacity for bilateral contracts, and few investors are available for trilateral contracts.
Changes after the introduction of PHBM in KPH Pemalang
There are some changes on forest management and forest access by local people after PHBM was introduced in KPH Pemalang (Table 4) .
1) Land allocation and mixed cropping
Perhutani allocated 0.25 ha per household for forest farmers prior to the introduction of PHBM. At that time, forest farmers were permitted to engage in Tumpang Sari -the Indonesian Taungya system -for three years.
As mentioned above, after the introduction of PHBM, the distribution of allocated land became a collaborative action between Perhutani and the LMDH; in general, the allocated land was equally distributed among the par ticipative forest farmers at the compar tment in Glandang and Surajaya villages. In addition to Tumpang Sari, after the third year of PHBM , s introduction, forest farmers were permitted to cultivate agricultural crops by clear cutting which did not disturb the growth of the trees that had been planted.
2) Forest Village Community Association and Forest

Farmer Group
Ther e had been for est far mer gr oups (KTH) in compartments prior to the introduction of PHBM in KPH Pemalang. Although the name KTH , is still in use, the essence of the former and cur rent groups is quite different. While forest farmers could lease forest land for two to five years, they could extend their access rights for 15 to 60 years if they organised themselves into a KTH under the social forestry program in 1986 (Peluso 1992).
On the other hand, Rosyadi et al. (2005) mentioned that the main aim of establishing a KTH was to control the political dynamics in rural forest areas and prevent state forests from being used illegally by villagers. The role of previous KTHs, therefore, was to facilitate state forest management through information dissemination to forest farmers. Back then, the KTH was not a par tner of 
3) Illegal logging
One of the most important reasons Perhutani introduced PHBM was for the latter to serve as a countermeasure against illegal logging. In common with other state forests, intensive plundering and illegal logging has occurred in KPH Pemalang (Astuti et al. 2004) . Table 5 traces the effect of PHBM in KPH Pemalang on illegal logging. In 2004, shortly after the introduction of PHBM, 601 incidents of illegal logging were repor ted, with damage estimated at 1.6 billion Indonesian Rupiah (IDR).
The statistics have dropped significantly since then: in 2010, the incidents of illegal logging were down to 74, and the damage was calculated at 96.2 million IDR. water quality, and rise in temperature.
4) Benefit sharing of timber production
The main assumption of benefit sharing is that local people would diligently protect the forest if they are given fair benefits for their efforts (Lindayati 2000) . One of PHBM guidelines stipulates benefit sharing as a factor in the successful implementation of the system (Perum Perhutani 2007 , Perum Perhutani 2009 . However, benefit sharing was not originally recognised when PHBM guidelines were drafted. Lindayati (2000) reported that proposal of benefit sharing was met with fierce opposition from Perhutani top-level and mainstream managers. Table 6 ).
In Glandang and Surajaya villages, the method of allocating benefits is specified by the by-laws of their
LMDHs. Both associations have established two types of allocation method, based on the presence or absence of forest farmers at compartments ( Table 7) . Where forest farmers were absent, the forest had been afforested by (Fig. 2) . The benefit sharing, therefore, contributes to the development of Surajaya village.
Attitudes of local people toward PHBM 1) Attribution of respondents
The individual respondents could be classified based on the 1) absence and presence of allocated land in the state forest, 2) position in the LMDH, and 3) main business.
Fur ther more, a full-time far ming group could be categorised into two subgroups based on the ownership pattern of arable land: dr y land (Tegalan) and/or rice field (Sawah) ( Table 8) .
Almost all board members are people whose main businesses are not farming (80.0%), and seven of them do not manage allocated lands in the state forest. The board members also tend to have a higher educational level than non-board members. Some of the responding board members said that ideally, LMDH board members should be composed of farmers but the farmers were lack of capacity for the required tasks.
In regard to private land owned by 54 respondents, those who owned dry land and/or rice fields were limited.
The 12 respondents who were engaged in farming as a side business (hereinafter, side-farming people , ) owned chose Sengon (Table 11) . At the same time, many nonboard members (18.8%) indicated following the decision by Perhutani , 1 and incomprehensible , (25.0%).
As to why they chose JPP, about half of respondents replied that JPP is expected to fetch a good price 2 . They also pointed out that JPP is disease-free differently from Sengon which suffered rampant disease, and that Sengon is inappropriate for the current land condition. Some respondents added two more reasons for selecting JPP: 1) teak enabled agricultural cultivation for longer periods because its leaves allowed more sunlight to reach the land surface than Sengon did and 2) teak was good for 1 What tree species to plant will be decided based on a mutual consultation between LMDH and Perhutani; some respondents appeared to think that the tree species would be chosen by Perhutani alone. 2 The actual price remains unclear because JPP teak has not yet reached selling time (=harvest time) in KPH Pemalang. forest conser vation because unlike Sengon, its leaves could not be used as fodder for livestock.
4) Awareness of benefit sharing and sharing rate
Benefit sharing is one of the features of PHBM. Around 75% of the respondents knew of benefit sharing, but only 53.7% knew the sharing rate (Table 12) . Moreover, there was a large gap between the board members and the nonboard members regarding awareness of benefit sharing.
Whereas all board members appreciated benefit sharing and the sharing rate, less than one quarter (21.9%) of the non-board members did, and 43.8 % did not know about the benefit sharing of PHBM.
Subsequently, we asked the respondents about their attitudes toward the cur rent sharing rate (75% for Perhutani and 25% for the LMDH in the general contract).
Around 70% answered that the rate was not sufficient for the LMDH. On the other hand, side-farming people demonstrated a somewhat higher enough , ratio than the other categorised groups.
Further, the 55% of respondents who considered the rate insufficient pointed out that their desired sharing 
Note: Multiple answers *) All respondents are board members of the LMDH. Source: Field research (2010; 2011) rate for the LMDH would be more than 50%. Even there was no significant dif ference between the response tendencies of full-time farmers and side-farming people, there was a big disparity between respondents who managed allocated lands and those who did not. For those who did not manage allocated land, the relatively low sharing rate (from 25% to 50%) was enough for the LMDH.
5) Awareness of village development with the shared benefit
Social infrastructures have been developed with the shared benefit in Surajaya village. About 70% (the sum of the strong awareness , and awareness , responses) of the respondents from the village were conscious of the development of the village using the shared benefit (Table 13 ). All board members knew of the village , s Know the system but not the rate 0 ( 
Note: There are things which do not add up to 100% due to rounding off *) All respondents are board members of the LMDH Source: Field research (2010; 2011) development resulting from the benefit sharing of PHBM, but 37.5% of non-board members did not. More than half of the landless famers replied that they did not know about the infrastructure construction.
DISCUSSION
The findings showed the effectiveness and challenges of PHBM to date in KPH Pemalang. After the introduction of PHBM, illegal logging and the resulting damage decreased ever y year. Therefore, it can be said that PHBM mitigates the damage caused by illegal logging, although further research is necessary to examine other aspects, such as the social economic and ecological factors which decline illegal logging (Astuti et al. 2004) .
Furthermore, the benefit sharing of timber production, which is one of the big featur es of PHBM, has contributed to the development of the village. Besides, whereas previous social forestry was mainly implemented to rehabilitate degraded land in state forests, there has On the other hand, about half of the board members felt there was insufficient transparency in the decisionmaking between Perhutani and the LMDH. In fact, one of the reasons behind the introduction of PHBM was the failure of the PMDH scheme, which resulted in a simple labour-for-land-deal in actual practice (Mayers and Vermeulen 2002) . To avoid making the same mistake, it is thus essential to increase the transparency between P e r h u t a n i a n d t h e L M D H f o r f u r t h e r P H B M implementation.
The findings also showed that there was a disparity Accordingly, it also would appear that the non-board members primarily participate in PHBM for acquisition of allocated land rather than for the benefit sharing and the village development.
For effective collaborative forest management, trust and transparency on agreement are argued to be the main condition (Nawir et al. 2007) . Benefit sharing according to the fairness and equity of forest products, serves as an incentive for collaboration (Tropenbos International 2005) . Fairness must be based on a realistic assessment of costs and benefits (Nawir et al. 2003; Thin and Gardingen 2004) , and the concept of equity requires a reference to social context, which may vary over time in tandem with social change (Mahanty et al. 2006 ). An agreement that is flexible enough to adapt to changing socio-economic conditions and accommodate renegotiation is thus necessar y for the long-term sustainability of forest management (Nawir et al. 2003 , Nawir and Santoso 2005 , Nawir et al. 2007 .
In accordance with the discussion above, the benefit sharing rate in KPH Pemalang should also take into account the equity between Perhutani and the LMDH, and its equitability should be based on the input cost (i.e. rent of land from Perhutani and cost of the LMDH labour). The sharing rate should also be flexible to social and economic changes, such as fluctuations in timber prices, increases in commodity prices and wages, and a changing social structure at several stages of PHBM contract in order to achieve stable living standards for forest farmers befitting the contemporar y era. An equitable benefit sharing rate will likely increase the satisfaction of both Perhutani and the LMDH under PHBM in KPH Pemalang.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study clearly showed the contract configuration and organisation structure of PHBM, the changes after its introduction, the frame of mind and attitude of local people, and the challenges for the further implementation of PHBM.
We conclude that PHBM has high potential as a new approach to manage state forest sustainably, resulting in a stable supply of wood and boosting local prosperity through benefit/cost sharing between Perhutani and the local communities. However, there are many challenges t o t h e s u s t a i n a b i l i t y o f P H B M i n t h e l o n g r u n .
Maintaining a par tnership scheme under long-term contracts is more difficult than the initiation process , (Nawir et al. 2003) . has not yet been harvested in KPH Pemalang. The actual quality and timber price of JPP are also important criteria in choosing the tree species for the next afforestation, as they will greatly af fect forest management and the household economy of the farmers under PHBM scheme.
Thus, fur ther research is needed to examine the influence of JPP after the initiation of the thinning and clear-cutting of the trees in KPH Pemalang.
